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Comments
EVIDENCE-CURATIVE ADMISSIBILITY IN MISSOURI
I. INTRODUcTION
Curative admissibility' has been used in Missouri courts since before the
turn of the century 2 although its recognition by the judiciary as a doctrine is
relatively modem. 3 Surprisingly however, a recent Missouri opinion expressed
uncertainty regarding the theory and scope of the doctrine,4 and a survey of the
cases reveals much conflict of opinion in this state. This confusion may be attrib-
utable to a similar uncertainty or unfamiliarity with the doctrine among the
members of the bar. It is the purpose of this article to (1) isolate the doctrine,
(2) attempt to state the Missouri Rule, and (3) analyze its theory, development,
and role in trial practice.
Curative admissibility is not a doctrine, but rather a set of doctrines competing
for recognition in American courts.5 These various views respond to the following
question: Does one inadmissibility justify or excuse another?6 Or, to state the
problem more completely: If one party offers inadmissible evidence which is re-
ceived, may the opponent afterwards offer similar evidence whose only claim to
admission is that it negates or counter-balances the prior inadmissible evidence?
For example:
An action arose out of a three car collision which occurred as follows:
Plaintiff was guest passenger in a southbound automobile driven by de-
fendant. Another auto overtook this car just below the crest of a hill. A
northbound auto appeared over the hill, and in an effort to avoid a colli-
sion, the overtaking car pulled back into the southbound lane early, striking
the car in which plaintiff and defendant were riding, causing it to go out of
control. Simultaneously, the northbound vehicle, unable to get off the
right side of the road in time, struck the overtaking car on its left side as
it returned to the southbound lane. At trial plaintiff named the driver of
the car he was riding in as defendant. No other driver was present since
the oncoming driver was dead and the passing driver was beyond service
of process.
The investigating officer appeared as a witness for plaintiff. He testi-
fied without objection that the passing driver said that he was forced to
1. The origin of the term is unknown. It is not a modern one, however, inas-
much as it appears in 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 15 (1st ed. 1904).
2. Mason v. Fourteen Min. Co., 82 Mo. App. 367, 371 (K.C. Ct. App. 1899).
3. Biener v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 160 S.W.2d 780, 786 (St. L. Mo. App.
1942) is the first Missouri case to use the term.
4. Young v. Dueringer, 401 S.W.2d 165, 168 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
5. 1 WIGMOR, EVIDENCE § 15 (3rd ed. 1940).
6. The language is Wigmore's. Id. at 304.
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pass when the defendant slowed down without warning. On cross-
examination, defendant asked the officer what the oncoming driver had
said about the cause of the accident. Plaintiff objected claiming this called
for hearsay testimony.7
Should the court allow the evidence? The hearsay statement of the oncoming
driver was offered to negate or counter the similar statement attributed to the
passing driver by the already admitted testimony of the officer. Clearly, if de-
fendant had duly objected to the officer's testimony regarding the passing driver's
statement, and was erroneously overruled, he cannot claim a right to present simi-
lar inadmissible evidence, because his objection, in theory, would save him on
appeal,8 and he needs no other protection. However, if he did not object, as here,
to the admission of the first evidence, through inadvertence, or design, he has
no such protection. Thus the question: Can he protect himself by retorting in kind?
II. CURATIVE ADMISSIBILITY
The foregoing question presents a multitude of complex problems to which
American courts respond in one of three, ways: a minority say absolutely not, a
majority say yes, and an intermediate group, following the so called Massa-
chusetts Rule, say sometimes.0
A. The Minority Rule
In minority rule courts the doctrine is non-existant since the admission
of incompetent evidence without objection never justifies a rebuttal in kind. These
courts say simply there can be no equation of errors.10 In these opinions, emphasis
is placed on the opposing party's failure to object, reasoning that he has waived
his right to object and preserve his appeal,11 or that parties may not create a right
to present incompetent evidence by silence or consent, 12 or that public interest
demands that trials not be prolonged by the consideration of irrelevant issues.13
B. The Majority Rle
At the other extreme, the majority view declares that the opponent may re-
7. The trial court overruled plaintiff's objection and allowed the evidence.
This was affirmed on appeal. Sigman v. Kopp, 378 S.W.2d" 544 (Mo. 1964).
8. This protection is often more apparent than real, however, since the court
may decide on appeal the erroneous ruling was not sufficiently harmful to warrant
reversal and a new trial. See Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 267 Mo. 644, 666,
185 S.W. 208, 214 (1916).
9. The names used to designate the three views are taken from WIrMoRE,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 304-307.
10. Laursen v. Tidewater Assoc. Oil Co., 123 Cal. App.2d 813, 268 P.2d 104
(1954); Hall v. Smedley Co., 112 Conn. 115, 151 Atl. 321 (1930); Stapleton v.
Monroe, 111 Ga. 848, 36 S.E. 428 (1900); Baltimore & S.R.R. v. Woodruff, 4 Md.
242 (1853); Burnett v. Rutledge, 284 S.W.2d 944 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955).
11. Wickenkamp v. Wickenkamp, 77 Ill. 92 (1875).
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sort to similar inadmissible evidence.14 Here emphasis is placed on the original
party's introduction of improper evidence, the rationale being that he having
"opened the door" 15 is estopped from objecting to his opponent's response in
kind,16 or that having used similar evidence in his own case he has vouched for
its validity and is now in no position to complain.17 These opinions appear to
grant the use of curative evidence as a matter of right.
C. The Massachusetts Ride
In courts adhering to this view, the opponent may reply with similar evi-
dence whenever it is needed for removing unfair prejudice which might otherwise
prevail, but in no other case. This rule is supported by ample authority,'8 and
represents the position of the Federal courts as well.19 In these jurisdictions, the
factors considered in determining whether or not sufficient prejudice existed to
warrant the curative evidence vary widely from case to case with no apparent
logic or pattern. The Massachusetts Rule is clearly the most sophisticated ap-
proach to the problem, but its borders are ill defined rendering application un-
certain.
D. A Related Problem Distinguished
Before going further, a collateral problem closely related to curative admissi-
bility must be distinguished. When a part of a conversation or transaction which
is competent is in evidence, the court will often allow the balance of the conversa-
tion or transaction into evidence 20 even though it be, for example, hearsay.2 '
14. Smith v. Rice, 178 Iowa 673, 160 N.W. 6 (1916); Spaulding v. Chicago,
St. P. & K. C. Ry. Co., 98 Iowa 205, 67 N.W. 227 (1896); Caldwell v. Miller, 313
S.W.2d 862 (Ky. 1958); McNab v. Jeppesen, 258 Minn. 15, 102 N.W.2d 709
(1960); Wright v. Englebert, 193 Minn. 509, 259 N.W. 75 (1935).
15. Canfield Lumber Co. v. Kint Lumber Co., 148 Iowa 207, 127 N.W. 70
(1910); Marts v. Powell, 176 Mo. App. 124, 161 S.W. 871 (Spr. Ct. App. 1913).
16. Larabee Flour Mills v. West Plains Comm'n Co., 216 Mo. App. 257, 262
S.W. 389 (Spr. Ct. App. 1924); Mason v. Fourteen Min. Co., supra note 2.
17. Terry v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 231 Mo. App. 72, 34 S.W.2d 163 (K.C. Ct.
App. 1931); Robertson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 186 Mo. App. 281, 172 S.W.
60 (Spr. Ct. App. 1914); Enyeart v. Peterson, 184 Mo. App. 519, 170 S.W. 458
(Spr. Ct. App. 1914).
18. Mowry v. Smith, 9 Ati. 67 (Mass. 1864); Brown v. Perkins, 1 At. 89
(Mass. 1861); Medina v. People, 133 Colo. 67, 291 P.2d 1061 (1956); Denver
City Trust Co. v. Hills, 50 Colo. 328, 116 Pac. 125 (1911); Roy v. Com., 191 Va.
722, 62 S.E.2d 902 (1951); Graham v. Com., 127 Va. 808, 103 S.E. 565 (1920);
Gillett v. Lydon, 40 Wash.2d 915, 246 P.2d 1104 (1952).
19. Teague v. United States, 268 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1959); Crawford v.
United States, 198 F.2d 976 (D. C. Cir. 1952); Meyers v. United States, 147 F.2d
663 (9th Cir. 1945); Brink v. United States, 60 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1932); Gin
Bock Sing v. United States, 8 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1925); Carver v. United States,
164 U.S. 694 (1897); But cf. United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2nd Cir. 1963).
20. Waterous v. Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co., 353 Mo. 1093, 1107, 186
S.W.2d 456, 461 (1945) (recognizes the rule but refuses to apply it since more than
a single transaction was involved); Aly v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 336
Mo. 340, 352, 78 S.W.2d 851, 856 (1934); Barton County Rock Asphalt Co. v.
1967]
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Such evidence is permitted only insofar as it will eliminate confusion or facilitate
the jury's evaluation of the competent portion. In these cases, the latter evidence
derives its admissibility from what has gone before, but strictly speaking, is not a
response in kind to inadmissible evidence in the first instance. Missouri courts
often fail to make this distinction, however, validating such action at trial under
the banner of curative admissibility, or citing these cases in support of their ruling
in a pure curative admissibility situation.22 These cases are a product of and
contribute to the confusion in this state and should be regarded as a separate
and distinct problem.
III. THE DOCTRNE IN MIssouRI
A. History and Development
It is impossible to trace a logical development of the doctrine through the
Missouri cases. Because of the many variables which enter into the fact situations
giving rise to use of the doctrine,23 and the varying bodies of law in the United
States to which Missouri courts have been referred over the years, this state has
embraced, at various times, each of the three predominant views on curative
admissibility.
The earliest cases reflect a consistent trial court practice of admitting the
proffered curative evidence,24 and appellate courts consistently affirmed these
rulings.25 These opinions do not focus squarely on the issue, however, and deal
with the alleged error in very general language, stating that appellant's right to
complain was foreclosed by his having adduced similar evidence; 26 or that appel-
lant was as much responsible for the alleged error as his opponent;27 or that
City of Fayette, 236 Mo. App. 505, 509, 155 S.W.2d 771, 772 (K.C. Ct. App.
1941); Meinhardt v. White, 341 Mo. 446, 453, 107 S.W.2d 1061, 1065 (1937);
Miller v. Smith, 275 S.W. 769, 772 (K.C. Mo. App. 1925).
21. Peterman v. Crowley, 226 S.W. 944, 946 (Mo. 1920); Kelley v. Hudson,
407 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Spr. Mo. App. 1966); Schnurr v. Perlmutter, 71 S.W.2d 63,
67 (St. 'L. Mo. App. 1934); Rodgers v. Schroeder, 220 Mo. App. 575, 582, 287
S.W. 861, 864 (St. L. Ct. App. 1926).
22. Kelley v. Hudson, supra note 21, at 557 citing Young v. Dueringer, 401
S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966) and Dorn v. St. Louis Pub. Ser. Co., 250
S.W.2d 859 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
23. The author was unable to discern any pattern developing around the
existence or non-existence of a single variable in the cases; e.g. whether or not
there had been an objection to the original evidence, whether or not the trial court
allowed the curative evidence, how the curative evidence related to the issues in
the case.
24. Carpenter v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 189 Mo. App. 164, 169, 175
S.W. 234, 236 (Spr. Ct. App. 1915); Enyeart v. Peterson, supra note 17, at 522,
170 S.W. at 459; Robertson v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 17, at 285, 172
S,W. at 61; Harmon v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York, 170 Mo. App. 309, 316,
156 S.W. 87, 89 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913); Marts v. Powell, supra note 15, at 132, 161
S.W. at 873; McGinnis v. R. M. Rigby Printing Co., 132 Mo. App. 227, 233, 99
S.W. 4, 7 (K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
25. Ibid.
26. Enyeart v. Peterson, supra note 17, at 522, 170 S.W. at 459.
27. Marts v. Powell, supra note 15, at 132, 161 S.W. at 873.
[Vol. 32
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appellant invited the evidence.28 All of these opinions are grounded upon an
estoppel theory, and place the emphasis on the opponent's previous breach of the
rules of evidence. Although no single early opinion attempts to state a rule, these
cases when viewed together, appear to adopt the majority view29 allowing curative
evidence as a matter of right. This interpretation is buttressed by the fact that
these cases involve everything from evidence beyond the scope of the pleadings
30
to hearsay,31 and yet no opinion discusses prejudice or the character of evidence
to which this "rule," if such it was, should be properly applied.
Then in 1916 the Supreme Court of Missouri decided Buck v. St. Louis Union
Trust Co.,3 2 a will contest. Contestant appealed an adverse judgment at trial,
arguing that the refusal below to allow him to introduce curative evidence con-
stituted error. The court, after agreeing that respondent's evidence was "wholly
inadmissible and should have been excluded,"3 3 held the exclusion of appellant's
curative evidence was not error and affirmed. The opinion emphatically embraced
the minority rule,34 and ignored the existing line of Missouri cases discussed
previously. This statement of policy on curative admissibility was extremely un-
fortunate since appellant had duly objected to respondent's evidence below and
had been in the court's own words "erroneously overruled,"35 thus providing a
sufficient ground for a ruling on appeal without ever reaching the issue of his at-
tempt to offer curative evidence. The court's refusal to reverse judgment was
based upon its finding that none of the errors at trial was sufficient to warrant
overthrowing what it regarded as a just result.36
Despite the Buck dictum, the court in Pinson v. Jones,37 another will contest,
refused to reverse the trial court's admission of curative opinion evidence by lay
witnesses regarding testamentary capacity. The court found it unnecessary to
consider the merits of appellant's objections since he had pursued the same practice
in presenting his case, and was in no condition to complain of his opponent's incom-
petent evidence.38 The fact that the evidence in question in this case was highly
material (the court noted that without it neither side would have any evidence
on which to go to the jury) 39 appears to have been a major reason for the hold-
ing. However, three years later in Jones v. Werthan Bag Co.,40 precisely the con-
verse was the basis for an identical holding. The court held the admission of
28. Robertson v. Western Union Tel. Co., supra note 17, at 285, 172 S.W. at
61.
29. See text supra, part II B.
30. McGinnis v. R. M. Rigby Printing Co., 122 Mo. App. 227, 99 S.W. 4
(K.C. Ct. App. 1906).
31. Harmon v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co. of New York, 170 Mo. App. 309, 156
S.W. 87 (K.C. Ct. App. 1913).
32. 267 Mo. 644, 185 S.W. 208 (1916).
33. Id. at 661, 185 S.W. at 213.
34. Id. citing Stapleton v. Monroe, supra note 10.
35. Id. at 661, 185 S.W. at 213.
36. Id. at 666, 185 S.W. at 214.
37. 221 S.W. 80 (Mo. 1920).
38. Id. at 87.
39. Ibid.
40. 254 S.W. 4 (Mo. 1923).
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curative evidence below was not error on the ground that such testimony related
to a "collateral issue." 4' 1 The court stated, inter alia, that "in common fairness,
it was within the discretion of the court to permit plaintiffs .. . to refute the
statement and remove the prejudice .... -42 In support of this position, the
court cited several of the pre-Buck estoppel decisions 43 This was the first opinion
to discuss the issue of prejudice, and introduced the collateral versus non-collateral
evidence distinction. Subsequent cases did not follow the Jones view, however,
and affirmed the admission of curative evidence without regard for the nature of
the original or rebutting evidence.4 4 By 1936 the Kansas City Court of Appeals
went as far as to assert the estoppel theory cases constituted a "well settled rule
in this state," but made no attempt to state the rule or explore its boundaries 4 5
In 1942 the St. Louis Court of Appeals applied the doctrine by name in
Biener v. St. Louis Public Service Co. and departed from previous cases by assert-
ing Missouri adhered to the Massachusetts Rule set out by Professor Wigmore 4e
citing several of the earlier cases. 47 The suit for personal injuries went to trial on
an agreed statement of facts with defendant public service company admitting
responsibility for the streetcar collision, but denying plaintiff was injured. All of
defendant's cross-examinations were calculated to create the inference that the
force of the collision was too slight to injure anyone. A plaintiff witness was then
allowed to state, over a hearsay48 objection, that another passenger was confined
to the hospital for a week following the collision. In affirming this ruling the court
stated:
41. Id. at 10. The word "collateral" is used by the courts as well as by the
author to denote the opposite of relevant and material. Apparently the frequent
use of the word by the courts is an attempt to avoid confusion between collateral
matters and matters which may be relevant but not material or material but not
relevant.
42. Id. at 11.
43. Jones v. Werthan Bag Co., supra note 40, at 11, citing Enyeart v. Peter-
son, supra note 17, and Marts v. Powell, supra note 15.
44. Union Electric Light and Power Co. v. Snyder Estate Co., 65 F.2d 297,
311 (8th Cir. 1933) (relevant hearsay; reversed on other grounds); Massman v.
Muehlebach, 231 Mo. App. 72, 80, 95 S.W.2d 808, 814 (K.C. Ct. App. 1936) (evi-
dence made relevant by affirmative defense); McCall v. City of Butler, 285 S.W.
1018, 1020 (K.C. Mo. App. 1926) (evidence of repairs); Larabee Flour Mills v.
West Plains Comm'n. Co., 216 Mo. App. 257, 263, 262 S.W. 389, 391 (Spr. Ct.
App. 1924) (parole to vary the terms of a contract); But Long v. F. W. Wool-
worth Co., 232 Mo. App. 417, 427, 109 S.W.2d 85, 91 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937) (ir-
relevant evidence); Terry v. Woodmen Acc. Co., 225 Mo. App. 1223, 1228, 34
S.W.2d 163, 165 (K.C. Ct. App. 1931) (irrelevant testimony); Rainier v. Quincy
0. & K. C. R. Co., 271 S.W. 500, 503 (Mo. 1925) (irrelevant evidence).
45. Massman v. Muehlebach, supra note 44, citing Larabee Flour Mills v.
West Plains Comm'n. Co., supra note 44.
46. 160 S.W.2d 780, 786 (St. L. Mo. App. 1942).
47. Including Jones v. Werthan Bag Co., supra note 40; Long v. F. W.
Woolworth Co., 232 Mo. App. 417, 109 S.W.2d 85 (K.C. Ct. App. 1937); and
Enyeart v. Peterson, supra note 17.
48. This was an objection to hearsay conduct; the fact that a third party
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Where ... collateral matters are once permitted ... without objection
when first offered ... , if by limiting full inquiry an unfair advantage would
accrue to one of the parties, the trial court should not be convicted of abuse
of discretion by allowing full scope to the inquiry .... The effect of ruling
out the evidence complained of by appellant herein would have been
to deny respondent the right to rebut the prejudicial effect of evidence
brought out by appellant . . ..4
The Biener opinion,50 by asserting Missouri followed the Massachusetts Rule re-
inforced the Jones5l view regarding the importance of prejudice or unfair ad-
vantage as a big factor. These two cases, particularly Biener because of its
emphatic statement of the rule, indicated a trend away from the previous estoppel
cases embracing the curative-evidence-as-a-matter-of-right view in favor of the
more sophisticated Massachusetts Rule. Furthermore, since both involved irrelevant,
immaterial evidence, and rely heavily on this fact, Missouri appeared to be limit-
ing the application of the Massachusetts Rule to cases where the evidence in
question was collateral. 52
Just two years later the development of a Missouri rule took a long step
backward in an opinion by the same court that decided Biener. Longmire v.
Diagraph-Bradley Stencil Machine Corp.53 was an action for payment for services
rendered in procuring a third party's investment of capital in defendant's business.
Without objection plaintiff was allowed to state that at the time of making the
contract he expected to be paid. On appeal defendant claimed error in the court's
exclusion of his own evidence to the effect that he never intended to pay. De-
fendant argued that plaintiff having adduced similar evidence was estopped from
objecting to his. The court squarely rejected this, stating inter alia "We do not so
understand the law. Because an ... improper question is asked and answered, it
will not justify another that is equally obnoxious or objectionable.154 The court
continued:
It is insisted ... as plaintiff opened the door for the admission of the
... incompetent matter he must take the consequences. This view loses
sight of the well-established rule that one error of the court does not
authorize its repetition by the opposite party .... 55
With this statement, Missouri returned to 1916 and the Buck5" minority rule. This
assertion of the court's opinion regarding curative admissibility was altogether un-
49. Biener v. St. Louis Pub. Ser. Co., supra note 46, at 785 (emphasis added).
50. Id. at 786.
51. Jones v. Werthan Bag Co., supra note 40.
52. The evidence in Biener concerned the conduct of a third person not a
party to the suit, and therefore, had no bearing on the issue of whether or not
plaintiff was injured by defendant. In Jones, the evidence in question related to
whether or not a plaintiff's witness had been previously discharged from defendant's
employ for inefficiency. Thus it was inpeaching evidence and not directed to the
central issue of defendant's liability.
53. 176 S.W.2d 635 (St. L. Mo. App. 1944).
54. Id. at 646.
55. Id. citing Redman v. Peirsol, 39 Mo. App. 173 (St. L. Ct. App. 1890).
56. Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., supra note 32.
1967]
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necessary here just as it was in Buck. This is so because appellant contented since
plaintiff offered inadmissible testimony on one issue, to wit: Longmire's intention,
defendant had a right to offer inadmissible testimony on an entirely different
question, to wit: his own intention. The fact, if it be a fact, that defendant did
not expect to pay, would in no manner prove that Longmire did not expect pay.
Following this analysis, the court concludes defendant's offer could not have been
for the purpose of meeting an issue which plaintiff improperly brought into the
case.57 Viewed thus, the case does not present a curative admissibility situation,
although defendant thought it did and gave the court an opportunity to reassert
the minority rule. That the Longmire opinion tempered its statement of the
minority view by asserting such was not the rule when the evidence in question
was purely collateral,58 thus appearing to distinguish Jones and Biener, proved to
be a short lived exception to its statement of the law. In Shepard v. Shepard"9
two years later, a trial court's allowance of curative evidence on a collateral point
was reversedG0 citing Longmire, Redman,61 and Buck.
In 1952 a landmark decision was rendered. The comprehensive opinion in
Dorn v. St. Louis Public Service Co. 62 faced the conflict of Missouri opinions and
attempted to resolve it. In plaintiff's action for injuries sustained in a collision
between it and a streetcar, plaintiff had judgment in circuit court and defendant
appealed. In the presentation of its case plaintiff, without objection, read into
evidence portions of the hospital records relating to the diagnosis and treatment of
plaintiff's injury. Just prior to the closing of its case plaintiff formally offered into
evidence all of its exhibits including portions of the hospital records. These were
admitted without objection. Defendant's doctor then testified that from his exami-
nation of x-rays of plaintiff's right shoulder, the fracture was much older than
the date of the accident in question. Defendant then offered x-ray reports which
were part of the hospital records brought into court in response to a subpoena
duces teucum served on the hospital by plaintiff. Plaintiff objected to the x-ray
57. Longmire v. Diagraph-Bradley Stencil Mach. Corp., supra note 53, at 647.
The court's analysis and conclusion that the proffered curative evidence went to a
different issue than the original evidence is open to question. The ultimate issue
in the case was the nature of the agreement between the parties. Surely the ex-
pectations of each party must have arisen from the nature of their relationship and
their agreement. Therefore, each party's evidence bore on the same issue: their
actual agreement. Similarly, in the example set out in the Introduction, supra, the
ultimate issue was the cause of the accident. Thus, the passing driver's understand-
ing of the cause could be rebutted by the oncoming driver's belief regarding the
cause of the collision. However, if the Longmire court's analysis is applied to
that case, the oncoming driver's belief must be offered to rebut the fact of the
passing driver's belief, which it clearly can not do. Therefore, it is obvious that
when applying the doctrine of curative admissibility, the courts must view the
original and rebutting evidence in the light of how both bear on the ultimate issue
to which they were directed. To do otherwise, results in hopeless confusion re-
garding the proper application of the doctrine.
58. Id.
59. 194 S.W.2d 319 (K.C. Mo. App. 1946).
60. Id. at 324.
61. Redman v. Peirsol, supra note 55.
62. 250 S.W.2d 859 (St. L. Mo. App. 1952).
[Vol. 32
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interpretation report because this would inject into the trial the opinion of an ex-
pert not subject to cross-examination. The court sustained this objection excluding
defendant's evidence as hearsay. The offer of proof showed the reports tended to
prove the injury was an old one antedating the accident in question. Defendant
claimed this ruling was reversible error, arguing his curative evidence ought to have
been admitted. Agreeing, the court reversed and remanded. After noting that
neither party made any attempt to qualify the records as evidence admissible
under section 490.680, RSMo 1949,63 the court continued:
• ' * respondent was the first to resort to hearsay in support of his
cause, [and] . . . under the circumstances [is] in no position to object to
appellant meeting it with evidence of like kind. The doctrine of curative
admissibility is applicable. .... Appellant was unfairly prejudiced by the
action of the trial court in excluding appellant's Exhibit .... The evidence
should have been admitted.64
On rehearing, plaintiff-respondent contended the court's holding was in conflict with
Buck v. St. Louis Union Trust Co.65 In rejecting this argument the court distin-
guished that case from the instant one by pointing out the evidence in Buck was
irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. The opinion then proceeded to analyze its
holding as follows:
In the case at bar, the evidence offered by appellant and excluded by
the court was, in fact, logically relevant, and was offered to rebut evidence
which went into the record without objection on the part of appellant.
Appellant thus elected to protect itself, not by objecting to respondents
evidence on the ground that no proper foundation had been laid, but by
using portions of the hospital record favorable to its cause which had been
brought into court by respondent, but not offered by him....
The rule that irrelevant, incompetent, or illegal evidence may be ad-
mitted to rebut evidence of like character is rightly limited to cases where
the rebuttal is confined to the evidential fact to which the original evi-
dence was directed. It does not permit the indiscriminate introduction of
like evidence touching other issues. The permissible office of such evidence
is merely to neutralize by direct contradiction the force and effect of the
inadmissible evidence offered by the adverse party, and afford reciprocal
rights to the parties in the use of evidence which the original party has
in effect vouched for as being the kind of evidence properly to be considered.
Nor is the rule confined merely to the introduction of immaterial
evidence, as contended by respondent. It applies not only to the subject
matter of evidence, but also its nature. 66
63. Now § 490.680, RSMo 1959. A record of an act, condition or event, shall,
insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified wit-
ness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made
in the regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition, or event,
and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and time
of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
64. Dorn v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 62, at 865.
65. 267 Mo. 644, 185 S.W. 208 (1916).
66. 250 S.W.2d at 866 (emphasis in original).
9
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The Dorn analysis is the most comprehensive of the Missouri opinions deal-
ing with curative admissibility. Subsequent cases, either expressly or impliedly,
follow its holding and analysis with statements such as ". . . having injected the
matter into the case for the purpose of deriving a benefit, [appellant] is in no
position to complain;" T6 or "the sour must be taken with the sweet;"68 or "it was
evidence of the same caliber as that originally brought into the case by plaintiff...
[and] having opened the door, appellant is in no condition to complain . . . ;-09
or ". . . having voluntarily selected the area of combat [plaintiff] should not be
permitted to complain on appeal that defendants met her on her selected ground." 70
B. The Modern Ride
The St. Louis Court of Appeals statement of the Missouri Rule in Dorn71
can not be improved upon. Viewed generally it is an adoption of the Massachusetts
Rule. However, upon closer analysis it reveals a more sophisticated and definitive
approach to the curative admissibility problem. As it stands today, the Missouri
Rule contains the following elements:
1. The original evidence must have been admitted without objection
(either through accident or design) so that the opposing party has
no recourse save curative evidence.
2. The curative rebuttal must have been confined to the evidential point
to which the original evidence was directed.
3. The court must find the curative evidence was required to neutralize
and contradict an unfair advantage gained by the opposing party's use
of the original improper evidence.
4. If all of the above elements are present, the Rule is applicable without
regard for the nature or subject matter of the evidence in question.
Wigmore7 2 indicates the divergent views on curative admissibility in the
United States are the result of conflicting trial rulings and the refusal of appellate
courts to substitute judgment on the matter and reverse. Noting that in nearly all
the minority rule cases the evidence was excluded at trial, and that the converse is
true in majority rule jurisdictions, he concludes the problem is one of trial court
discretion, modified only by an occasional appellate reversal in Massachusetts Rule
cases when the prejudice resulting from the ruling below is great enough to war-
rant it.7 s The divergent opinions in Missouri are no doubt in part a result of this
practice since a survey of the cases reveals an overwhelming majority of the
opinions affirm the ruling below and adopt whichever view is necessary to support
it. The Missouri Rule as stated in Dorn, however, appears to be sufficiently com-
prehensive, yet flexible enough, to survive this procedural barrier to the formula-
67. State ex. rel. State Highway Comm'n. v. Schutte Inv. Co., 334 S.W.2d
241, 247 (Mo. 1960).
68. Vanneman v. W. T. Grant Co., 351 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Mo. 1961).
69. Sigman v. Kopp, 378 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Mo. 1964).
70. Eddings v. Keller, 400 S.W.2d 164, 174 (Mo. 1966).
71. Dorn v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 62, at 866.
72. 1 WiMom, EVIDENCE § 15 (3rd ed. 1940).
73. Id. at 309.
[Vol. 32
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 4 [1967], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol32/iss4/6
COMMENTS
tion of a consistent rule. Young v. Dueringer,74 the most recent Missouri opinion,
took a crucial step toward crystalizing the Dorn statement as the Missouri Rule.
In that case the trial court sustained the original party's objection to the prof-
fered curative evidence. But instead of affirming the ruling as previous courts had
done when faced with such a situation,75 thereby embracing the minority rule,
the court reversed and remanded.76 The opinion quotes the language of Dorn77
and indicates a willingness on the part of Missouri appellate courts to apply the
Dorn rule on the appellate level. Thus, while the ruling below is a factor to he
considered in resolving the question, Missouri appears unwilling to leave the mat-
ter exclusively to the trial judge's discretion, and has found the Dor language
to be flexible enough to allow a substitution of judgment on a question of the ad-
missibility of evidence.
IV. PROBLEMS OF APPLICATION
A. Tkeory
The Missouri Rule is grounded upon an estoppel theory, to wit: the party
objecting to the curative evidence is estopped by virtue of his prior conduct, and,
given the other required elements, the evidence must be allowed. However, there
is a series of recent Missouri cases which reach exactly the same result, but do so
on a waiver theory. 8 These cases take the position that the right to object to the
curative evidence was waived when the objector presented similarly inadmissible
evidence. Without exploring the niceties of distinction between waiver and estoppel,
it may safely be said that this approach amounts to the Missouri Rule in different
language. A recent case employs both terms in the same opinion70 with the result
that whatever label is attached to the theory, the Missouri Rule remains un-
affected. Hopefully this situation will not breed needless confusion, and divert
opinions from a clear analysis of the problem.
B. Scope
What is the scope of the Missouri Rule? What kinds of situations are properly
subject to the rule? These questions remain inadequately answered, and will prove
to be the largest obstacle to the application of the modem Missouri Rule. The
Dorn assertion that the Rule applies ". . . not only to the subject matter of evi-
dence, but also its nature" s0 is unfortunately too broad a statement to provide
74. 401 S.W.2d 165 (St. L. Mo. App. 1966).
75. With the exception of Dor v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 62.
76. Young v. Dueringer, supra note 74, at 168.
77. Id. at 167.
78. Land Clearance Authority v. Doerenhoefer, 404 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Mo.
En Banc 1966); Alvey v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 360 S.W.2d 231, 234 (Mo. 1962);
Jackson County v. Meyer, 356 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Mo. 1962); Bowyer v. Te-co, Inc.,
310 S.W.2d 892, 895 (Mo. 1958); Moore v. Adams' Estate, 303 S.W.2d 936, 939
(Mo. 1957).
79. Young v. Dueringer, supra note 74, at 167.
80. Dorn v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., supra note 62, at 867.
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much of a guideline. If the "subject matter" of evidence is that which is considered
in determining its relevancy and materiality, and the "nature" of evidence refers
to whether it is characterized as hearsay, opinion, or fact testimony, then the scope
of the rule is unlimited. It would apply equally to all evidentiary situations.
Perhaps a better approach would be to analyze the particular evidence in
question to determine why it is inadmissible. Is it because of a rule of law as with
parole evidence offered to alter or vary the terms of a written contract? Or, is it
because of an overriding social policy as in the exclusion of evidence of repairs as
an admission of fault? Or, is it inadmissible because of a rule of evidence in favor
of only the best evidence at trial to the exclusion of that which is of little probative
value and may tend to confuse the jury as in the case of hearsay? Missouri has
applied the rule in each of the above situations without comment or analysis.8 '
Further refinement of the Missouri Rule is hampered by the fact that terms such
as collateral, incompetent, or illegal, when applied in opinions to evidence without
analysis as to why the evidence is so classified, or for what purpose it was offered,
or how it related to the specific issues, do not mean anything. Yet Missouri
opinions are replete with these terms, and as long as this situation continues it will
be difficult to find a basis on which to limit the application of the Missouri Rule.
There remains one further problem relating to the scope of the rule. The Mis-
souri Rule, set out previously, requires that the curative rebuttal have been confined
to the evidential point to which the original evidence was directed.82 Most courts
are quite strict on this element. However, in Zarisky v. Kansas City Public Service
Co., s a plaintiff, cross-examining defendant's doctor, was permitted to make im-
proper inquiries concerning the frequency with which the doctor had appeared in
personal injury cases as a witness for defendant solely because defendant had
pursued a similar line of impeachment when cross-examining plaintiff's doctor.8 4
The basis for the holding was curative admissibility; the court stating defendant
was in no position to complain.8 5 This case broadens the rule to encompass even
improper trial tactics, and does not -limit curative evidence to direct rebuttal of the
original evidence since the improper impeachment of plaintiff's doctor is in no way
cured by similarly impeaching defendant's. Whether this case is the isolated
result of careless analysis, or will serve to broaden the rule in the future remains
to be seen. If it should be followed, curative admissibility could serve as a means
81. Sigman v. Kopp, supra note 69 (hearsay); McCall v. City of Butler,
supra note 44 (repairs); Larabee Flour Mills v. West Plains Comm'n. Co., supra
note 44 (parole evidence).
82. See text supra, part III B.
83. 239 Mo. App. 396, 186 S.W.2d 854 (K.C. Ct. App. 1945).
84. In the cross-examination of plaintiff's doctor, defendant inquired at length,
over plaintiff's objection, concerning the number of personal injury cases in which
the doctor had testified wherein one of the counsel for plaintiff in the case at bar
was the attorney for plaintiffs. Subsequently, plaintiff entered into a similar field
of inquiry wherein it was shown by naming specific cases that defendant's doctor
usually testified for defendant, and always said plaintiff was not injured or at
least not by any act of defendant, and that often jury verdicts proved him to
have been wrong.
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for turning the adversary system into an exercise in gamesmanship and double
dealing which, if carried to its logical extreme, could corrupt all established rules
of evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
The divergent views on the use of curative evidence which plagued Missouri
courts, and persist across the United States are most adequately explained as
reflections of conflicting social policies. First, we have a policy that trials ought
not be cluttered with all manner of collateral matters and improper evidence. The
courts are burdened enough when their business is expedited in a proper manner.
Thus, the rule that one error does not justify another, and that parties may not
create a right to try immaterial matters by silence or consent. Second, there is a
policy that one ought not be allowed to profit from his own willful violation of the
rules.8 6 Therefore, allow curative evidence and thus remove his advantage. This
view has the additional function of serving a policy against needless and costly
appeals by curing the matter at trial. Finally, a directly conflicting policy that one
ought not be permitted ultimately to benefit from his own mistake, to wit: his
failure to object to the original evidence. Thus, the rule that curative evidence be
denied except in those cases where the prejudice resulting from such a ruling is so
manifest that the second social policy prevails over the third.
Viewed in this light, the Missouri Rule as stated in Dorn v. St. Louis Public
Service Co.87 and applied in Young v. Dueringer88 attains a stature sufficient to
warrant its recognition as a solution to the problem of the admissibility of cura-
tive evidence. The elements of the Rule8 9 are definitive enough to constitute a
workable rule, and flexible enough to satisfy the conflicting dictates of social policy.
Improper evidence on a matter so far removed from the issues of the case as to
violate the policy against cluttered trials could hardly result in the degree of
prejudice required by the third element of the Missouri Rule to warrant curative
evidence. Thus, Missouri could refuse the curing evidence without doing violence
to the Rule. The policy against allowing one to profit from his own violation of
the rules of evidence is satisfied since the fact that he has gained an advantage
requires the allowance of curative evidence. Finally, the Missouri Rule will not
permit one to profit from his own failure to object, since the court can find the
curative evidence accomplished more than its permissible office of neutralizing an
advantage gained by direct contradiction. Such a finding would authorize the court
to reverse the admission of the curative evidence below and order a new trial.
86. He would indeed profit inasmuch as inadmissible evidence, once received
without objection, is to be considered and given its natural probative effect as if
it were in law admissible. See Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 450 (1912);
Fellows v. Farmer, 379 S.W.2d 842, 846 (Spr. Mo. App. 1964); Turner v. Yellow
Cab Co., 361 S.W.2d 149, 154 (Spr. Mo. App. 1962); Edmisten v. Dousette, 334
S.W.2d 746, 753 (Spr. Mo. App. 1960) (and cases collected note 13 therein).
87. 250 S.W.2d at 886.
88. 401 S.W.2d 165.
89. See text supra, part III B.
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Originally, the doctrine of curative admissibility was the product of an at-
tempt on the part of trial courts to allow a wronged party to correct the error.
However, Missouri appears to have developed a rule of appellate review, which
enables the reviewing court to deal with any situation and put the parties back
on an even basis. The Missouri Rule represents a long process of evolution, and
satisfies the requirements of a sophisticated, workable rule. Although problems
remain regarding its proper application, these are minor and should prove no
barrier to its development into a recognized and established rule of law.
JAMEs M. BECK
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